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ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the involvement of the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”) in Georgia and Ukraine, and the impact the 
ICC has had on mobilizing national authorities and civil society in the 
two countries, in order to address impunity for international crimes. 
Both Georgia and Ukraine, with Russia as their adversary, share 
many commonalities in dealing with the conflict-related crimes. 
However, it appears that the ICC’s involvement has produced different 
effects in each country in terms of the ability of domestic authorities to 
deal with the conflict-related crimes. This Article describes how the 
ICC’s involvement in Georgia and Ukraine has affected domestic 
processes in terms of legal reform, mobilization of civil society, and 
domestic prosecution of the conflict-related crimes. It compares and 
contrasts both situations by highlighting the challenges encountered by 
both countries, and the ways in which the ICC has impacted domestic 
processes. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines the involvement of the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”) in Georgia and Ukraine, and the impact 
the ICC has had on mobilizing national authorities and civil 
society in the two countries in order to address impunity for 
international crimes. Both Georgia and Ukraine—faced with 
Russia as their adversary—share many commonalities in dealing 
with the conflict-related crimes. These include non-cooperation 
by the Russian authorities, lack of effective control over parts of 
their territory, and associated challenges in the evidence 
collection process. However, it appears that the ICC’s 
involvement has produced different effects in each country in 
terms of the ability of domestic authorities to deal with the 
conflict-related crimes.  
Georgia is in a state of limbo, exhibiting complete inaction 
at the domestic level despite the existence of the appropriate 
national legal framework on the criminalization of international 
crimes. Ukraine is pushing forward for necessary domestic legal 
reforms on harmonizing its legislation with international law and 
exhibits more enthusiasm for prosecuting the conflict-related 
crimes. However, Ukraine has struggled to achieve its ambitious 
goals to date. In both Georgia and Ukraine, the ICC has been a 
topic that has been high on the political agenda. However, in 
both countries this has been marred by divided opinions ranging 
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from open hostility towards the ICC to overwhelming approval of 
the ICC as an institution capable of addressing the impunity gap.  
Part II of this Article provides the background of the conflict 
in both countries and explains how the situations came before the 
ICC. Part III describes how the ICC’s involvement has affected 
domestic processes in terms of legal reform, mobilization of civil 
society, and domestic prosecution of the conflict-related crimes. 
The last Part of the Article compares and contrasts both situations 
by highlighting the challenges encountered by both countries, 
and the ways in which the ICC has impacted domestic processes. 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT AND ICC’S 
INVOLVEMENT 
A. Georgia 
The conflict in Georgia stems from historical factors and 
events that germinated following the collapse of the Soviet Union 
(“USSR”) and the civil wars that ensued.1 When the USSR 
crumbled in the 1990s, pro-Russian South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
were reluctant to accept Georgian rule, as they enjoyed 
autonomous status within the USSR.2 Georgia went on to 
completely abolish South Ossetian autonomy on December 11, 
1990.3 On May 29, 1992, the South Ossetian parliament declared 
its independence from Georgia, which led to the exacerbation of 
the conflict across South Ossetia and Abkhazia.4 The conflict 
raged on until ceasefires put an end to the worst of the fighting5 
 
1. See Nina Markovic, Behind the Scenes of the Russia-Georgia Conflict, PARLIAMENT 
AUSTL. (Sept. 17, 2008), 
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamenta
ry_Library/pubs/BN/0809/RussiaGeorgiaConflict [https://perma.cc/ZSH2-URJN]. 
2. See Thomas D. Grant, Frozen Conflicts and International Law, 50 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 361, 383-90 (2017). 
3. Закон Республики Грузия от 11.12.1990 No. 63-І «Об упразднении Юго-Осетинской автономной области [Law of the Republic of Georgia No. 63-I on the 
Abolition of the Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia] (Dec. 11, 1990). 
4. ВЕРХОВНЫЙ СОВЕТ РЕСПУБЛИКИ ЮЖНАЯ ОСЕТИЯ [SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE 
SOUTH OSSETIAN REPUBLIC], О Принятии Акта о независимости Республики Южная Осетия [ON ADOPTION OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH OSSETIA] (May 
29, 1992). 
5. On June 24, 1992, Georgia and Russia signed the Agreement on Principles of 
Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict. Two years later, on October 31, 1994, 
Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia, and North Ossetia, signed another Agreement on 
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and remained “frozen” until 2003 when the former Georgian 
president, Mikheil Saakashvili, came to power promising North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) membership for Georgia 
and the restoration of Georgian control over South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia.6 
In 2008, South Ossetian and Abkhazian aspirations for 
independence were strengthened by Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence from Serbia. Around the same time, Russia 
indicated its support for the South Ossetian separatists and 
established closer ties with both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 
which further aggravated existing tensions with Georgia.7 The 
relationship between Georgia and Russia reached an all-time low 
resulting in a five-day armed conflict between the two countries 
in August 2008 in the pro-Russian breakaway region of South 
Ossetia. Hostilities came to a halt as a result of the EU-mediated 
Six Point Agreement between Georgia and Russia.8 According to 
the EU fact-finding report, an estimated 850 lives were lost, and 
more than 100,000 civilians fled their homes during the conflict.9 
Additionally, by early September 2008, Georgia’s Ministry of 
Justice registered 125,819 internally displaced persons (“IDPs”).10 
The ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (“OTP”) immediately 
responded to the Georgia-Russia conflict, with the Prosecutor 
announcing the commencement of a proprio motu preliminary 
examination into the situation in Georgia as early as August 14, 
2008. Following a seven-year preliminary examination, on 
October 13, 2015, the Prosecutor submitted her request for 
 
Further Development of Georgian-Ossetian Peaceful Settlement Process and on Joint 
Control Commission. Grant, supra note 2, at 384. 
6. See М. Саакашвили  официально  вступил  в должность президента  Грузии 
[M. Saakashvili Officially Inaugurated as President of Georgia], КАВКАЗСКИЙ УЗЕЛ 
[CAUCASIAN KNOT] (Jan. 26, 2004), https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/49724/ 
[https://perma.cc/W3XY-5MPS]. 
7. See Grant, supra note 2, at 385. 
8. Frozen Conflicts in Georgia: Is There a Way Out?, EUR. PARLIAMENT (June 7, 2018), 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/agenda/briefing/2018-06-11/9/frozen-
conflicts-in-georgia-is-there-a-way-out [https://perma.cc/9VWG-Z2GZ].  
9. INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE CONFLICT IN 
GEORGIA, REPORT: VOLUME I 5 (2009) [hereinafter Georgia Fact-Finding Report]. 
10. GEORGIAN YOUNG LAWYERS’ ASS'N ET AL., AUGUST RUINS: REPORT OF THE 
GEORGIAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS ON VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS & INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: AUGUST WAR 2008 xi (2009) 
[hereinafter August Ruins Report]. 
2021] VENTURING EAST 739 
authorization of an investigation into the situation in Georgia to 
the Pre-Trial Chamber (“PTC”).11 Four months later, PTC I 
authorized the initiation of an investigation into alleged crimes 
against humanity12 and war crimes13 committed in and around 
South Ossetia between July 1 and October 10, 2008.14 The 
situation is one of many firsts: the first instance where the ICC 
Prosecutor initiated an investigation into a situation arising 
outside of the African continent; the first instance an 
investigation has been initiated into a situation in a post-Soviet 
country; and the first situation involving alleged crimes 
committed in the context of an international armed conflict. 
B. Ukraine 
The situation in Ukraine was sparked by anti-government 
protests in 2013-2014 linked to the former government’s decision 
to walk away from the EU association agreement under pressure 
from the Kremlin. Dissatisfied with the government’s foreign 
policy direction, many Ukrainians took to the streets to 
participate in peaceful protests demanding closer ties with the EU 
(commonly referred to as the Maidan protests). The protests 
quickly turned violent when the former government authorized 
the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies to unleash violence 
against the protesters. The clashes between the riot police and 
protesters resulted in around 100 deaths and over 1,000 injuries 
among the protesters.15 In response to the Maidan crimes, the 
 
11. See Situation in Georgia, Case No. ICC-01/15, Request for Authorisation of an 
Investigation Pursuant to Article 15, ICC-01/15-4 (Oct. 13, 2015); Situation in Georgia, 
Case No. ICC-01/15, Corrected Version of “Request for Authorisation of an Investigation 
Pursuant to Article 15”, 16 Oct. 2015, ICC-01/15-4-Corr2 (Nov. 17, 2017) [hereinafter 
ICC Prosecutor’s Request /Georgia]. 
12. Situation in Georgia, Case No. ICC-01/15, Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Request for Authorization of an Investigation, ICC-01/15-12, ¶ 7 (Jan. 27, 2016) 
[hereinafter PTC Investigation Decision/Georgia]. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. ¶ 26. 
15. See Реєстр проваджень про злочини, пов’язані із перешкоджанням проведенню мирних акцій протесту, які відбувалися у Києві та інших містах України в період листопада 2013 року – лютого 2014 року [Register of Proceedings of 
Crimes Committed During Peaceful Protests in Kyiv and other Ukrainian Cities], Офіс Генерального прокурора України [GEN. PROSECUTOR’S OFF. UKR.], 
https://rrg.gp.gov.ua/ [https://perma.cc/74BD-6MB7] (stating that during the 
protests 78 civilians were killed, around 200 civilians sustained gunshot wounds, and 
more than 1,000 civilians were injured). 
740 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:3 
Ukrainian parliament adopted a declaration accepting the ad hoc 
jurisdiction of the ICC that, in its temporal scope, covered the 
alleged crimes committed during the protests.16 Having reviewed 
evidence on the alleged crimes, the ICC Prosecutor decided not 
to pursue a preliminary examination, concluding that the alleged 
crimes did not constitute crimes against humanity due to the lack 
of evidence that such crimes were committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population.17 
The Maidan protests in Kyiv exacerbated secessionist 
sentiments in Crimea, which led to the referendum on the future 
status of Crimea within Ukraine in the presence of the Russian 
military disguised as “little green men,” and the subsequent 
“incorporation” of Crimea into the territory of the Russian 
Federation by Russian federal law.18 This move by Russia outraged 
the international community that condemned the occupation of 
Crimea as a flagrant violation of international law.19 However, 
Russia asserts its sovereign rights over Crimea by virtue of the 
right of the “Crimean people” to self-determination and 
unilateral secession.20 From the moment of Russia’s assumption 
 
16. See Declaration of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to the ICC on the recognition 
of the jurisdiction of the ICC by Ukraine over crimes against humanity, committed by 
senior officials of the state, which led to extremely grave consequences and mass murder 
of Ukrainian nationals during peaceful protests within the period 21 November 2013–22 
February 2014, Case No. 790-VII (Feb. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Declaration I]. For more 
see Iryna Marchuk, Ukraine and the International Criminal Court: Implications of the Ad Hoc 
Jurisdiction Acceptance and Beyond, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 323, 337-46 (2016). 
17. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF THE ICC, REPORT ON PRELIMINARY 
EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES § 95 (Nov. 12, 2015). 
18.  Федеральный конституционный закон от 21 марта 2014 г. N 6-ФКЗ "О принятии в Российскую Федерацию Республики Крым и образовании в составе Российской Федерации новых субъектов - Республики Крым и города федерального значения Севастополя"  
 [Federal Constitutional Law of Mar. 21, 2014 N 6-ФКЗ “On admitting to the Russian 
Federation the Republic of Crimea and establishing within the Russian Federation new 
constituent entities the Republic of Crimea and the city of federal significance 
Sevastopol”] Собрание законодательства Российской Федерации [SZRF] [Russian 
Federation Collection of Legislation] 2014, No. 12, p. 1201. 
19. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 68/262 (Apr. 1, 2014); Reconsideration on Substantive 
Grounds of the Previously Ratified Credentials of the Russian Delegation, EUR. PARL. 
ASS.,  16th Sess., Resolution 1990 (2014). 
20. Address by President of the Russian Federation, PRESIDENT RUSS. (Mar. 18, 2014), 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603 [https://perma.cc/3D5U-
LK3W]; Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
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of effective control over Crimea in late February 2014, 
international organizations and the Ukrainian government 
maintain that the Russian government has orchestrated a 
deliberate campaign of targeting actual and perceived opponents 
of the newly instituted regime, through a wide range of 
persecutory and discriminatory measures.21 Russia has 
consistently denied such allegations, arguing that Ukraine’s 
assertions are nothing more than “political propaganda” aimed 
at discrediting Russia.22 
In parallel to the events in Crimea, secessionist movements 
were gaining ground in eastern Ukraine, which led to a full-scale 
armed conflict between the Ukrainian armed forces and pro-
Russian separatist groups. Russia has allegedly backed the 
separatist groups by continuously supplying arms, weaponry, 
funds, and manpower, which it categorically denies.23 The 
turning point in the conflict was the shooting down of the MH17 
civilian passenger jet passing over the territory of eastern 
Ukraine.24 Following this, the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (“ICRC”) recognized the conflict in eastern Ukraine 
as a non-international armed conflict (“NIAC”).25 However, 
Russia’s degree of involvement in eastern Ukraine and its supply 
of the Buk missile, which was used to shoot down the aircraft,26 
cast doubt on the accuracy of the legal qualification of the conflict 
 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Verbatim Record, 2017 
I.C.J. 2, ¶ 3 (Mar. 7, 2017). 
21. See, e.g., politically motivated trials on bogus charges, deportation and forcible 
transfer, unlawful detention and unlawful house searches, torture and ill-treatment, 
enforced disappearances, etc. Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) Grand Chamber Hearing, EUR. 
CT. HUM. RTS. WEBCAST (Sept. 11, 2019); see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), 2021 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. § 510-5 (2021). 
22. Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) Grand Chamber Hearing, supra note 21. 
23. Iryna Marchuk, Ukraine v Russia at the ICJ Hearings on Indication of Provisional 
Measures: Who Leads?, EJIL:TALK! (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/ukraine-v-
russia-at-the-icj-hearings-on-indication-of-provisional-measures-who-leads/ 
[https://perma.cc/KV3Y-5ST8].  
24. DUTCH SAFETY BD., MH17 CRASH (2015). 
25. Press Release, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Ukraine: ICRC Calls on All Sides 




26. MH17 - The Open Source Investigation, Three Years Later,  BELLINGCAT (Jul. 17, 
2017), https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2017/07/17/mh17-open-
source-investigation-three-years-later/ [https://perma.cc/5JQV-26B7]. 
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in eastern Ukraine. The question arises as to whether the conflict 
in eastern Ukraine has already transformed into a single 
international armed conflict (“IAC”) by virtue of Russia’s exercise 
of overall control over the pro-Russian separatist groups.27 The 
two ceasefire agreements, Minsk Protocol I of September 5, 2014 
and Minsk Protocol II of February 11, 2015, failed to achieve 
conflict resolution in eastern Ukraine. The newly elected 
government of Ukraine resumed peace talks with the Kremlin, 
which led to some early signs of progress (i.e. the release and 
exchange of conflict-related detainees, including prisoners of war 
and political prisoners).28 However, although the conflict has 
reduced in intensity, it continues to simmer at the backdrop of 
low-scale violence. 
The events in Crimea and eastern Ukraine led the Ukrainian 
government to lodge a separate declaration accepting the ad hoc 
jurisdiction of the ICC, which covered alleged crimes associated 
with the occupation of Crimea and the fighting in eastern 
Ukraine.29 Unlike its first declaration, which was limited in its 
temporal scope to the Maidan events, this second declaration 
applies from February 20, 2014 onwards. The declaration 
attributes blame to “senior officials of the Russian Federation and 
leaders of the terrorist organizations “DNR” and “LNR.”30 
However, the ICC Prosecutor’s mandate requires her to examine 
the responsibility of all parties involved; therefore, she is not 
obligated to limit the scope of her inquiry to the responsibility of 
the parties as specified in Ukraine’s declaration.31 
 
27. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF THE ICC, REPORT ON PRELIMINARY 
EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES § 170 (Nov. 14, 2016). 
28. Press Release, United Nations Secretary-General, Secretary-General Welcomes 
Eastern Ukraine Prisoner Exchange Ahead of Orthodox Easter, U.N. Press Release 
SG/SM/20048 (Apr. 16, 2020). 
29. Declaration of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the recognition of the 
jurisdiction of the ICC by Ukraine over crimes against humanity and war crimes 
committed by senior officials of the Russian Federation and leaders of the Russian 
Federation and leaders of terrorist organizations “DNR” and “LNR”, which led to 
extremely grave consequences and mass murder of Ukrainian nationals, case no. 145-
VIII (Feb. 4, 2015) [hereinafter Declaration II].  
30. Id. 
31. Iryna Marchuk, Dealing with The Ongoing Conflict at the Heart of Europe: On the 
ICC Prosecutor’s Difficult Choices in the Preliminary Examination into the Situation of Ukraine, 
in 1 QUALITY CONTROL IN PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS 371, 371-97, 388 (2018). 
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The OTP recently concluded the ICC’s preliminary 
examination into the situation in Ukraine.32 The OTP confirmed 
that all criteria for opening an investigation have been met, 
including the jurisdiction, admissibility and the interests of 
justice.33 The next step is to seek authorization from the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to open investigations.34 However, the conclusion of the 
preliminary examination coincided with the operational 
challenges generated by the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as 
lingering uncertainty surrounding the election of the new ICC 
Prosecutor.35 The outgoing ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, 
intends to consult with the incoming Prosecutor, Karim Khan, on 
the strategic and operational challenges faced by the OTP with 
respect to the prioritization of its workload and the pending 
submissions to the PTC requesting the opening of 
investigations.36  Should the PTC authorize the opening of an 
investigation, Ukraine will become the second post-Soviet country 
on the ICC’s watch list at loggerheads with Russia. The prospects 
of the situation in Ukraine proceeding to the investigation stage 
are high and there is nothing indicating that the PTC will have 
any solid reasons for disagreeing with the OTP’s assessment.37 
 
32. Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, Statement of the Prosecutor, Fatou 
Bensouda, on the Conclusion of the Preliminary Examination in the Situation of Ukraine 
(Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=201211-otp-statement-
ukraine [https://perma.cc/4X2R-QZDW] [hereinafter OTP Ukraine Statement].  
33. Id.; see also Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Report on Preliminary 
Examination Activities § 289 (Dec. 14, 2020) [hereinafter 2020 OTP Report]. 
34. See OTP Ukraine Statement, supra note 32. 
35. The election of the new ICC Prosecutor took place at the second resumed 19th 
session of the Assembly of States Parties, which was held on February 12, 2021. See Election 
of the Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. CT. (2020), https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/elections/prosecutor/Pages/Prosecutor2020.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/PF3A-YQY8]. 
36. See OTP Ukraine Statement, supra note 32. 
37. Iryna Marchuk & Aloka Wanigasuriya, The ICC concludes its preliminary 
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III. IMPACT OF THE ICC ON DOMESTIC PROCESSES 
A. Legal reform 
1. Georgia 
Georgia signed the Rome Statute on July 18, 1998 and 
deposited its instrument of ratification with the ICC on 
September 5, 2003,38 which provides for ICC jurisdiction from 
December 1, 2003 onwards. Subsequently, Georgia brought its 
domestic laws in line with the Rome Statute in order to allow for 
possible national prosecution of international crimes. The 
Criminal Code of Georgia (“CCG”) was amended to provide for 
the “surrender and extradition of offenders” suspected of 
committing international crimes to the ICC for criminal 
prosecution.39 Section 14 of the CCG criminalizes a separate 
category of crimes titled “Crime against Humanity, Peace and 
Security and against International Humanitarian Law” (Articles 
404-413), which includes the crime of aggression (Articles 404-
405), genocide (Article 407), crimes against humanity (Article 
408) and war crimes (Articles 411-413). Hence, ratifying the 
Rome Statute had the effect of prompting Georgia to implement 
domestic legislation that could facilitate the domestic 
prosecution of international crimes. 
These legislative reforms came into effect well before the 
Georgia-Russia conflict and the subsequent ICC preliminary 
examination and investigation, thus placing the country’s 
criminal justice system in an advantageous position legislatively to 
prosecute international crimes at the national level. However, 
from the outset of the ICC investigation, civil society called for 
domestic capacity building, making it doubtful whether Georgia’s 
judicial system and the actors involved had the necessary capacity 
and skills to undertake such domestic investigative and 
prosecutorial action, despite being armed with the necessary 
 
38.  Int’l Criminal Court, Georgia, https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/eastern%20european%20states/Pages/georgi
a.aspx [https://perma.cc/8EG8-D982] (last visited Aug. 5, 2020); Criminal Code of 
Georgia, arts. 6(1)-(2) (1999). 
39. Criminal Code of Georgia, art. 6 (1999). 
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legislative framework.40 Regardless, as discussed below in Section 
III.B.1 of this Article, the available legislative framework in 
Georgia was not sufficient in itself to translate into effective 
investigations or domestic trials on the charges of international 
crimes. 
2. Ukraine 
Ukraine signed the Rome Statute as early as January 20, 2000, 
but despite the ongoing lobbying campaign urging the 
parliament to speed up the ratification process, Ukraine has 
failed to ratify it.41 The initial obstacle to ratification of the Rome 
Statute was the decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in 
2001 that found the ICC’s principle of complementarity to be in 
conflict with the Constitution of Ukraine.42 In particular, the 
Constitutional Court of Ukraine found that any potential ICC 
involvement would be contrary to the constitutional provision 
which conferred exclusive competence in matters of the judiciary 
to the Ukrainian national courts.43 The only way forward out of 
such a stalemate was to amend this provision in order to 
accommodate the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
Fifteen years passed before the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 
adopted the necessary constitutional amendments aimed at 
overhauling the judicial system, which allowed for the jurisdiction 
of the ICC only three years after the adoption of such 
 
40. Georgia: A Test Case for the ICC’s Future, CICC GLOBAL JUST. (Feb. 23, 2016), 
https://ciccglobaljustice.wordpress.com/2016/02/23/georgia-a-test-case-for-the-iccs-
future/ [https://perma.cc/C8T9-C56Q]. 
41. Letter from the Coalition for the ICC to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of 
Ukraine (Sept. 23, 2019), 
https://coalitionfortheicc.org/sites/default/files/cicc_documents/Letter%20to%2
0the%20President%20of%20Ukraine_ICC%20Rome%20Statute_CICC%20&%20me
mbers_FINALupdated.pdf [https://perma.cc/SPY9-EDFP]. The Coalition for the 
ICC and its members sent a letter to the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 
calling for prompt ratification of the ICC Rome Statute and commitment to fight 
impunity domestically. 
42. Висновок Конституційного Суду України у справі за конституційним поданням Президента України про надання висновку щодо відповідності Конституції України Римського Статуту Міжнародного кримінального суду 
[Decision on the Submission of the President of Ukraine Regarding Conformity of the 
Constitution of Ukraine with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Case 
No. 1-35/2001], Конституційний Суд України [Constitutional Court of Ukraine],  (July 
11, 2001). For more, see Marchuk, supra note 16, at 326-33. 
43. Id. § 2.8. 
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amendments, i.e. as of June 30, 2019.44 As mentioned elsewhere,45 
a plausible explanation behind the three-year delay period was 
the parliamentarians’ strategic move to postpone ratification of 
the Rome Statute until after the parliamentary elections in 2019. 
However, notwithstanding the removal of the constitutional 
obstacle to ratification, the newly elected Ukrainian parliament 
in 2019 is yet to ratify the Rome Statute by means of adopting a 
specific law on ratification.46 The reluctance of Ukrainian 
parliamentarians to move forward with ratification is largely due 
to the fear of a potential ICC investigation targeting members of 
the Ukrainian armed forces, as well as a superficial understanding 
as to how the ICC’s principle of complementarity operates in 
practice.47 
Ratifying the Rome Statute should be of utmost priority to 
Ukraine in light of the ongoing occupation of Crimea and the 
conflict in eastern Ukraine. The glaring absence of international 
crimes in the Criminal Code of Ukraine, with the exception of a 
few imperfect provisions, is a hindrance to the work of the 
Ukrainian national authorities in correctly qualifying the conflict-
related crimes. Moreover, it is peculiar that Ukraine subjects itself 
to the jurisdiction of the ICC by accepting the ad hoc jurisdiction 
of the ICC, but does not wish to commit to the ICC’s jurisdiction 
by becoming a fully-fledged state party to the Rome Statute. 
Putting the question of ratification aside, the draft law on the 
implementation of international criminal law and international 
humanitarian law into Ukrainian legislation has passed the first 
parliamentary hearing.48 The draft law introduces an extensive list 
 
44. Закон України про внесення змін до Конституції України (щодо правосуддя) [Law of Ukraine on Amending the Constitution of Ukraine (with regard 
to the administration of justice)], Відомості Верховної Ради [Verkhovna Rada Gazette], 
2016,  No. 28,  p. 532 (June 2, 2016). 
45. Marchuk, supra note 31, at 379. 
46. Закон України про міжнародні договори України [Law of Ukraine on 
International Treaties of Ukraine], Відомості Верховної Ради [Verkhovna Rada 
Gazette], 2004,  No. 50,  p. 540, art. 9 (June 29, 2004). 
47. Marchuk, supra note 31, at 379. 
48. Проект Закону про внесення змін до деяких законодавчих актів України щодо імплементації норм міжнародного кримінального та гуманітарного права 
[Draft Law on Amending Some Legislative Acts of Ukraine Regarding Implementation 
of International Criminal Law and International Humanitarian Law], No. 2689, (Dec. 
27, 2019) [hereinafter Draft Law]. The draft law was passed in the first hearing on 
September 17, 2020. 
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of criminal law provisions criminalizing all core international 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Notwithstanding that 
genocide (Article 442), the crime of aggression (Article 437), and 
violations of the laws and customs of war (Article 438) had already 
been criminalized by the Criminal Code (“CC”), the Ukrainian 
legislation seriously lags behind and fails to comply with 
international law. In particular, a clear lacuna in the law is visible 
with respect to war crimes. Article 438 (violations of the laws and 
customs of war) is a blanket norm, as it only directly lists a few 
specific violations of international humanitarian law,49 whereas 
for the remaining crimes it simply refers to the violations of the 
laws and customs of war prescribed in the treaties that have been 
ratified by Ukraine. In other words, only the violations of the laws 
and customs of war enumerated in international instruments, 
which had been duly ratified by Ukraine, can be prosecuted in 
accordance with Ukrainian criminal law. Hence, as it stands now, 
some war crimes, which form part of customary international law, 
fall outside the ambit of Ukrainian national law.  
The draft law encompasses a number of provisions on war 
crimes, which are divided into separate categories: (1) war crimes 
against a person (Article 438); (2) war crimes against property 
(Article 438-1); (3) war crimes involving prohibited methods of 
warfare (Article 438-2); (4) war crimes involving prohibited 
means of warfare (weapons) (Article 438-3); (5) war crimes 
against humanitarian operations and the use of protected 
symbols (Article 438-4); and (6) war crimes against movable and 
immovable valuable objects protected under international 
humanitarian law (Article 438-5).50 While a certain logic underlies 
the proposed classification of war crimes, it is rather confusing 
that grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and violations of 
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions are dispersed 
throughout the text of the draft law provisions. Hence, for a non-
expert in international humanitarian law or Ukrainian legal 
professionals lacking practical experience in this field, piecing 
together a coherent framework on war crimes may prove to be a 
daunting task. It might have been easier had the drafters chosen 
 
49. These include such war crimes as cruel treatment of prisoners of war or civilians; 
deportation of civilian population for forced labour; pillage of national heritage on 
occupied territories; and prohibited methods of warfare. 
50. Id. 
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to follow a more simplified classification of war crimes as outlined 
in the Rome Statute in light of the anticipated ratification of the 
Statute. 
Additionally, the current definition of the crime of 
aggression enumerated in Article 437 of the CC omits the 
leadership requirement, and references to the elements of scale 
and gravity. The draft law replicates the definition of the crime of 
aggression endorsed by States Parties to the Rome Statute of the 
ICC at the Review Conference in Kampala (2010).51 The most 
serious omission in Ukrainian criminal legislation is a glaring 
absence of the criminalization of crimes against humanity. The 
draft law addresses this serious lacuna in national criminal law by 
replicating the provision on crimes against humanity in the Rome 
Statute.52 The draft law appears to accommodate major 
developments of international law, however, it is somewhat 
confusing that different underlying acts of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity were moved around in the text, depending 
upon the sanction (sentence) assigned to each underlying act.53 
Undoubtedly, Ukraine’s acceptance of the ad hoc jurisdiction 
of the ICC has had a catalyzing impact on Ukrainian national law 
reforms, not only with respect to the prospective criminalization 
of core international crimes in conformity with the Rome Statute, 
but also with respect to clarification of a number of important 
practical issues (e.g. the transfer of persons into the custody of 
the ICC, the recognition of the decisions rendered by the ICC, 
etc.).54 However, these legislative initiatives have thus far failed to 
come to fruition. Political will is necessary to advance much-
needed reform of Ukrainian national law in order to align it with 
international law. 
As a non-ratifying state of the Rome Statute, the Ukrainian 
Parliament should read the latest ICC Prosecutor’s statement on 
the strategic and operational challenges it faces in relation to the 
prioritization of its workload as an active call to speed up the 
 
51. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8 bis, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 (inserted by resolution RC/Res.6 (June 11, 2010)). 
52. Draft Law, supra note 48, art. 442-1. 
53. Id. art. 438-442-1. 
54. Проект Закону про внесення змін до деяких законодавчих актів України щодо співробітництва з Міжнародним кримінальним судом [Draft Law on Amending 
Some Legislative Acts Regarding Cooperation with the International Criminal Court, No. 
7179] (Oct. 5, 2017) (recalled from the parliamentary agenda on August 29, 2019). 
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ratification of the Rome Statute.55 This would place Ukraine in a 
position of a financially contributing State Party to the overall 
budget of the Court and dispel any doubts as to why the situation 
of Ukraine should be prioritized over other situations concerning 
ICC States Parties. Absent the ratification of the Rome Statute, 
Ukraine’s attempts in the pursuit of justice appear at best half-
hearted.56  
B. Domestic Proceedings 
1. Georgia (and Russia) 
Following the Georgia-Russia war, both Georgia and Russia 
initiated investigations into the alleged crimes committed during 
the conflict.57 Such action was also encouraged by the Council of 
Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly (“PACE”), which “demanded 
that Russia and Georgia . . . investigate all allegations of human 
rights violations committed during the war and its aftermath and 
hold the perpetrators to account before domestic courts.”58 
On August 9, 2008, the General Prosecutor’s Office of 
Georgia announced the launch of an investigation into alleged 
violations of international humanitarian law, including the 
destruction and unlawful appropriation of civilian property 
during hostilities, pursuant to Articles 411 and 413 of the 
Georgian Criminal Code.59 The general public was assured that 
 
55. See Marchuk & Wanigasuriya, supra note 37.  
56. Id. 
57. Civilians in the Line of Fire: The Georgia-Russia Conflict, AMNESTY INT’L 56 (2008), 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/52000/eur040052008eng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MU3Z-B2MT] [hereinafter AI Georgia-Russia Conflict Report]; 
Georgia Fact-Finding Report, supra note 9, at 417-19; Human Rights Watch, Up In Flames: 
Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict Over South Ossetia (Jan. 23, 
2009), https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/01/23/flames/humanitarian-law-violations-
and-civilian-victims-conflict-over-south [https://perma.cc/325A-Q6LV]. 
58. Resolution 1633 (2008): The Consequences of the War between Georgia and Russia, 
COUNCIL OF EUR. PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY ¶¶ 22.8, 23 (Oct. 2, 2008), 
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=17681 
[https://perma.cc/L2Z2-3NUU]; The implementation of Resolution 1633 (2008) on the 
consequences of the war between Georgia and Russia, COUNCIL OF EUR. PARLIAMENTARY 
ASSEMBLY ¶¶ B.47 (Jan. 26, 2009), https://pace.coe.int/en/files/12131/html 
[https://perma.cc/4SCT-WQUU] [hereinafter PACE Implementation of Resolution 
1633]. 
59. AI Georgia-Russia Conflict Report, supra note 57, at 56; PACE Implementation 
of Resolution 1633, supra note 58, ¶ B.49. 
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all parties to the conflict would be investigated in an unbiased 
manner regardless of the perpetrators’ allegiances.60 
Additionally, on October 7, 2008, the Georgian Parliament 
established a special ad hoc commission chaired by a member of 
the parliamentary opposition, to probe the circumstances behind 
the war, how events unfolded, and the decisions made by the 
Georgian authorities.61 It commenced its work on October 10, 
2008 and heard testimonies from key decision makers who held 
positions of power during the war.62 The commission was to 
report back to the parliament and was also invested with the 
power to refer any incidents linked to criminal responsibility to 
the General Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia for investigation.63 
However, according to the Chairman of the commission, the 
commission’s focus was the political causes underlying the 
conflict, and no examination of possible war crimes was ever 
undertaken.64 The commission concluded its work and published 
its final report on December 18, 2008.65 Additionally, in 2013, 
Georgia’s Chief Prosecutor set up a separate working group to 
examine the legal basis for the conflict with Russia.66 
Similarly, in Russia, the Russian Public Chamber (a 
consultative institution comprised of civil society representatives) 
established a “Public Investigation Commission on War Crimes in 
South Ossetia and Civilian Victims Aid.”67 Additionally, the same 
year, the Investigative Committee of the General Prosecutor’s 
Office of Russia announced the initiation of a genocide probe to 
scrutinize the alleged actions of Georgian troops that led to the 
deaths of Russian citizens (i.e. ethnic Ossetians) living in South 
 
60. Id. 
61. PACE Implementation of Resolution 1633, supra note 58, ¶ B.40. 
62. Id. ¶ B.42. 
63. Id. ¶ B.40. 
64. Shorena Latatia, Five Years on, Georgia to Probe Facts of 2008 War, INST. FOR WAR 
& PEACE REPORTING (Aug. 7, 2013), https://www.refworld.org/docid/5204caf74.html 
[https://perma.cc/TD46-P8YA]. 
65. PACE Implementation of Resolution 1633, supra note 58, ¶ B.44. 
66. Latatia, supra note 64. 
67. Общественная палата Российской Федерации [Pub. Chamber of the Russian 
Fed’n], О работе Общественной палаты Российской Федерации в 2008 году [On Work 
of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation in 2008], PUBLIC CHAMBER RUSS. FED’N 28-
43, https://www.oprf.ru/files/analitc_rew08.pdf [https://perma.cc/8K2D-WKXP]. 
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Ossetia.68 Later the same month, the General Prosecutor’s Office 
initiated two cases: (i) concerning violations against the civilian 
population, and (ii) concerning crimes against the Russian 
military.69 Additionally, it is reported that the Russian authorities 
have been actively assisting and encouraging ethnic Ossetians to 
file applications to the European Court for Human Rights 
(“ECtHR”) against Georgia in relation to alleged violations of 
human rights arising out of the armed conflict.70 
As for domestic prosecutions in Russia, civil society 
organizations report that there was no indication that 
investigations would be carried out into any alleged violations of 
international law committed by Russian military forces or forces 
that were controlled by the de facto South Ossetian authorities 
during the conflict.71 However, Russia claims that it has been 
conducting national investigations.72 The Russian Ministry of 
Defence has repeatedly denied any wrongdoing by its military 
personnel with regard to violations of international humanitarian 
or human rights law.73 In mid-September 2008, the Investigative 
Committee is reported to have closed its investigations on the 
ground in South Ossetia despite credible reports of violations 
emerging from areas under Russian control.74 
While initially, it appeared as though both Georgian and 
Russian authorities were taking active steps to investigate and 
prosecute the alleged crimes emanating from the conflict, by 
October 2015 this only held true for Russia, which claimed to be 
investigating the alleged attacks against its peacekeepers.75 The 
Georgian authorities undertook some investigative activities from 
August 2008 until November 2014.76 However, a lull in national 
 
68.  Прокуратура РФ возбудила по факту убийств в Южной Осетии дело по статье "геноцид" [The Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation initiated criminal 
proceedings in relation to murder in South Ossetia on the charges of genocide], VESTI 
(Aug. 14, 2008), https://www.vesti.ru/article/2243135 [https://perma.cc/JJH7-
M5CM]. 
69. AI Georgia-Russia Conflict Report, supra note 57, at 56. 
70. PACE Implementation of Resolution 1633, supra note 58, ¶ B.53. 
71. AI Georgia-Russia Conflict Report, supra note 57, at 56; PACE Implementation 
of Resolution 1633, supra note 58, ¶ B.50. 
72. See PTC Investigation Decision/Georgia, supra note 12, ¶¶ 42-50. 
73. Georgia Fact-Finding Report, supra note 9, ¶ 418. 
74. PACE Implementation of Resolution 1633, supra note 58, ¶ B.50. 
75. PTC Investigation Decision/Georgia, supra note 12, ¶¶ 47-50. 
76. Id. ¶¶ 41, 278-302. 
752 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:3 
proceedings was observed from the end of 2012 until mid-2014.77 
Eventually, on March 17, 2015, the Georgian government sent a 
letter to the OTP informing of the indefinite suspension of 
national proceedings into cases related to the displacement of 
ethnic Georgians from South Ossetia.78 This letter had a 
significant impact on the complementarity assessment that was 
being carried out by the OTP. With no resumption of Georgian 
investigative activities in sight, the OTP assessed that the 
admissibility threshold for the initiation of an ICC investigation 
would be met “due to State inaction.”79 The information outlined 
in the letter stating that the progress of relevant national 
proceedings had been hampered by the fragile security situation 
in the occupied territories in Georgia and adjacent areas, was 
pivotal to the decision reached by the PTC regarding admissibility 
in its authorization decision.80 
2. Ukraine (and Russia) 
The sheer volume of crimes committed in Ukraine since the 
beginning of the conflict renders the investigation and 
prosecution of these crimes a top priority at the national level. It 
is well understood in Ukraine that even if the situation proceeds 
to the investigation stage (subject to the PTC’s approval) when 
individual suspects are identified, the number of cases to be tried 
by the ICC would be limited to a handful of high-level 
perpetrators. Notwithstanding this sober realization of how much 
the ICC can actually achieve in the situation of Ukraine, the 
acceptance of the ad hoc jurisdiction of the ICC has nevertheless 
had a catalyzing impact on pushing for a comprehensive legal 
reform in order to bring Ukrainian national legislation in 
conformity with international law.81 Such reform is a necessary 
prerequisite for conducting meaningful national investigations 
and prosecutions. Most conflict-related crimes are incorrectly 
qualified under the umbrella of terrorism offences, due to the 
previous government’s insistence on qualifying the conflict in 
 
77. See ICC Prosecutor’s Request /Georgia, supra note 11, ¶¶ 42, 279-302. 
78. See PTC Investigation Decision/Georgia, supra note 12, ¶ 41. 
79. ICC Prosecutor’s Request /Georgia, supra note 11, ¶ 42. 
80. PTC Investigation Decision/Georgia, supra note 12, ¶ 41. 
81. See supra Section III.A.2. 
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eastern Ukraine as an “anti-terrorism operation.”82 
Notwithstanding the confusion surrounding the qualification of 
crimes in eastern Ukraine, there appears to be a more coherent 
strategy on the qualification of alleged crimes in Crimea, which 
could be credited to coordinated efforts of the Crimean 
Prosecutor’s Office (“CPO”) working in exile from Kyiv. The 
OTP annual report (2016), which concluded that rules of IHL 
applied to the occupied Crimea, galvanized domestic prosecution 
efforts to correctly qualify alleged crimes in Crimea within the 
legal framework of IHL.83 
As a result, the CPO initiated a number of criminal 
proceedings under Article 438 of the Criminal Code. These 
criminal proceedings encompass underlying grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions (i.e. violations of the right to a fair and 
regular trial, willful killings, torture and ill-treatment, forcible 
conscription, deportations, and extensive appropriation of 
property not justified by military necessity).84 Other serious 
violations of the laws and customs of war, which are currently 
examined by the CPO, include Russia’s transfer of its own 
population into the territory of Crimea (colonization) and the 
use of human shields by the Russian military during the takeover 
of Ukrainian military facilities during the first phase of the 
conflict.85 Hence, national proceedings mirror the information 
provided to the ICC in Ukraine’s communications.86 
 
82. Указ Президента України № 405/2014 «Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 13 квітня 2014 року "Про невідкладні заходи щодо подолання терористичної загрози і збереження територіальної цілісності України» 
[Presidential Decree of Ukraine of April 14, 2014 No. 405/2014 “On extraordinary 
measures to withstand the terrorism threat and preservation of the territorial integrity of 
Ukraine”],  https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/4052014-16886 
[https://perma.cc/8UN3-5BHC]. 
83. See 2016 OTP Report, supra note 27, §158. 
84. See Єдиний реєстр досудових розслідувань [Unified Register of Pre-Trial 
Investigations], https://erdr.gp.gov.ua [https://perma.cc/46YL-SNZ2]; see Ukrainian 
Legal Advisory Grp., Principle of Complementarity: International Justice in Ukraine, JUST. FOR 
FUTURE 18 (2020) [hereinafter 2020 ULAG report]. 
85. See Єдиний реєстр досудових розслідувань [Unified Register of Pre-Trial 
Investigations], https://erdr.gp.gov.ua [https://perma.cc/46YL-SNZ2] (last visited Feb. 
4, 2021). 
86. See, e.g., Press Release, Прокуратура АРК та міста Севастополя [The  
Prosecutor’s Office of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol], До Міжнародного кримінального суду передали нові свідчення про злочини Росії в Криму [New Evidence of Russia’s crimes in Crimea has been submitted to the 
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However, despite some visible signs of progress with respect 
to the investigation of the conflict-related crimes, one might still 
doubt the genuine willingness and ability of the Ukrainian 
national authorities to prosecute such crimes. Ukraine exhibits 
more willingness towards prosecuting the alleged crimes in 
Crimea; however, its efforts have been thwarted by the 
inaccessibility of the territory due to Ukraine’s absence of 
effective control over Crimea. As a result, the Ukrainian national 
authorities cannot carry out the necessary investigative steps on 
the occupied territories. The only avenue through which to 
acquire evidence is to work with witnesses and victims physically 
present in mainland Ukraine who fled Crimea. Many of them are 
reluctant to provide testimony due to fear of retaliation from the 
Occupying Power’s authorities against them or their family 
members residing in Crimea. 
The situation with respect to the prosecution of the conflict-
related crimes is more complicated in eastern Ukraine. The 
Ukrainian authorities are not always able to investigate and 
prosecute the alleged crimes on the non-government controlled 
territories. Although such investigation options are more readily 
available on the government controlled territories, there appears 
to be greater reluctance on the part of the Ukrainian law 
enforcement agencies to investigate due to the shortage of 
resources and politically sensitive nature of the ongoing armed 
conflict.87 First, as mentioned above, the alleged crimes are 
incorrectly qualified under the umbrella of terrorist offences.88 
Second, as a general rule, investigations and prosecutions are 
one-sided, since the charges have almost predominantly been 
levied against members of the pro-Russian separatist groups, 
whereas the actions of the Ukrainian armed forces, Ukrainian 
Security Service, and Ukrainian Police remain largely 
 
International Criminal Court] (Mar. 29, 2018) (concerning the ICC communication on 
IDPs and Russia’s impact on the change of the demographic situation in Crimea),  
https://ark.gp.gov.ua/ua/videonew.html?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=22672
6 [https://perma.cc/ZF7S-WWY3]. 
87. Marchuk, supra note 31, at 392. 
88. 2020 ULAG Report, supra note 84, at 18-19 (referring to Статистична 
інформація, Офіс Генерального прокурора, https://www.gp.gov.ua/ua/1stat 
[https://perma.cc/XK63-5XQF] (last visited Feb. 4, 2020)). 
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unscrutinized,89 despite a number of credible reports on crimes 
having been committed by all sides to the conflict.90 Prosecutions 
are also complicated by the back and forth peace processes, as 
speculations are rife about granting amnesties to members of the 
pro-Russian separatist armed groups.91 On September 16, 2014, 
the Ukrainian parliament adopted the so-called “Amnesty Law 
Package” (No. 5081 and No. 5082) which meant to grant 
amnesties to pro-Russian rebels (although the law did not include 
amnesties for the rebels who committed “grave” crimes or were 
involved in the shooting down of the MH17 passenger aircraft). 
However, the law is largely “forgotten,” as the new negotiations 
are ongoing regarding the scope of amnesties. On October 20, 
2020, President Zelensky in his speech in the Ukrainian 
parliament clarified that blanket amnesties will not be applicable 
to those who have “blood on their hands.”92 
Most recently, a new specialized war crimes department was 
established within the General Prosecutor’s Office (“GPO”), 
which is expected to have a positive effect on the ability to 
prosecute war crimes and consolidate national prosecution 
efforts in Ukraine.93 Deputy Chief Prosecutor Gyunduz 
 
89. The most controversial criminal proceedings involve combatants of “Tornado” 
and “Aydar” volunteer battalions (previously integrated within the Ministry of Interior 
Affairs of Ukraine before being disbanded), who were charged with a long list of conflict-
related crimes, such as unlawful deprivation of liberty, torture, extortion, and gender-
based crimes. Some received long prison sentences, others suspended sentences or were 
acquitted. The proceedings stirred public controversy as to whether combatants of such 
battalions should be considered as “criminals” or “national heroes”. 
90. See Press Release, Truth Hounds, Воєнні злочини на сході України: зібране за 2019-2020 рр. [War Crimes in Eastern Ukraine: Collected Materials in 2019-2020] 
(Mar. 24, 2020), https://truth-hounds.org/voenni-zlochyny-na-shodi-ukrainy-2019-2020 
[https://perma.cc/DVA3-RXM2]; Ctr. for Civil Liberties, Eastern Ukraine: Civilians 
Caught in the Crossfire, INT’L FED’N FOR HUM. RTS. 4, 22-24 (2015); U.N. Off. of the High 
Comm’r for Hum. Rts, Rep. on Accountability for Killings in Ukraine From January 2014 
to May 2016, ¶ 62 (July 14, 2016). 
91. 2020 ULAG Report, supra note 84, at 20. 
92. Послання Президента України Володимира Зеленського до Верховної Ради 
про внутрішнє та зовнішнє становище України [President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Address 
to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Regarding the External and Internal Situation in Ukraine], 
OFF. PRESIDENT UKR. (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.president.gov.ua/news/poslannya-
prezidenta-ukrayini-volodimira-zelenskogo-do-verho-64717 [https://perma.cc/6V9L-
YGP8]. 
93. On October 21, 2019, former Prosecutor General Ruslan Ryaboshapko signed 
a decree on the establishment of the specialized GPO’s Department on Oversight of 
Criminal Proceedings in Relation to Crimes Committed During Armed Conflict. See Генеральна прокуратура України [Gen. Prosecutor’s Office of Ukraine], В 
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Mamedov, who is heading the department, reported that 214 
criminal proceedings have been registered under Article 438 of 
CC since 2014, 10 cases have been directed to national courts, and 
2 verdicts have been rendered.94 Notwithstanding these signs of 
progress, neither the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies nor 
the Ukrainian judiciary have had any experience in dealing with 
international crimes. This is one of the areas where the ICC 
contribution may prove to be invaluable. The ICC is capable of 
playing a more active role in capacity building of the Ukrainian 
legal sector, which could translate into successful domestic trials 
on the charges of international crimes.  
Having conducted an overview of national proceedings both 
in Ukraine and Russia, the OTP completed its admissibility 
assessment, concluding that the potential cases—likely to arise 
out of its investigation—would be admissible before the ICC.95 
The finding  stems from “domestic inaction” demonstrated both 
by Ukraine and Russia in relation to persons and conduct of 
potential interest to the ICC, as well as the “inability” of the 
Ukrainian authorities to obtain the accused and the necessary 
evidence given the absence of control over parts of its territory.96 
However, the PTC has yet to endorse the admissibility assessment, 
which has to give its “blessing” to proceed with an investigation. 
Should the PTC authorize the investigation, it is unclear how far 
down the chain of military command or political leadership the 
newly elected ICC Prosecutor will be willing to travel when 
pursuing potential cases.97 The furthest the Ukrainian national 
authorities got when initiating domestic proceedings in terms of 
 Генеральній прокуратурі створено Департамент нагляду у кримінальних провадженнях щодо злочинів, вчинених в умовах збройного конфлікту [The 
Department of Oversight in Criminal Proceedings Concerning Crimes Committed 




94. Gyunduz Mamedov, Принятие законопроекта №2689 – эффективное 
юридическое орудие для наказания преступников на Донбассе [Adoption of Draft Law 
No. 2689 As an Effective Legal Tool for Punishing War Criminals in Donbas], GORDON BLOG 
(Sept. 17, 2020), https://gordonua.com/blogs/gyunduz-mamedov/kriminalizaciya-
voennyh-prestupleniy-effektivnoe-yuridicheskoe-orudie-dlya-nakazaniya-voennyh-
prestupnikov-na-donbasse-1518930.html [https://perma.cc/EPS5-LSPU]. 
95. OTP 2020 Report, supra note 33, § 282.  
96. OTP 2020 Report, supra note 33, § 283.  
97. Marchuk & Wanigasuriya, supra note 37.  
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the chain of military command in Donbas were informal leaders 
of the DPR, namely Igor Girkin (also one of the accused in the 
MH17 trial before The Hague District Court) and Igor Bezler 
(alleged to have been assassinated by Russian special forces).98 As 
for the most senior Russian representative of its administration in 
Crimea, the most high-profile war crimes suspect to date has been 
a current MP of the Russian State Duma, Natalia Poklonskaya, 
who acted as the so-called “Crimean Prosecutor” after the 
occupation of Crimea and, in this role, supported politically 
motivated charges against members of the Crimean Tatar 
representative body “Mejlis” (which resulted in the organization 
being banned under the pretext of it being a “terrorist” 
organization and the imprisonment of its senior leaders).99 In 
2016, the then General Prosecutor of Ukraine, Yuriy Lutsenko, 
announced that his Office was bringing charges against the 
Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and other senior Russian 
officials, including its high-ranking military generals;100 however, 
the fate of these criminal proceedings is unknown. Russian 
authorities have not conducted any national proceedings in 
relation to the conflict-related crimes committed on the territory 
 
98. Id. (referring to the MH17 trial currently being heard before The District Court 
of the Hague). See also Офіс Генерального прокурора України [General Prosecutor’s 
Office of Ukr.], Колишньому «міністру оборони ДНР» повідомлено про підозру в 
порушенні законів та звичаїв війни, [“The former Minister of Defence of the DPR” was served 
a notice of suspicion on the charges of the violations of the laws and customs of war] (June 16, 
2016), https://www.gp.gov.ua/ua/news?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=275095 
[https://perma.cc/5U8R-6B2M]; Російські спецслужби ліквідували ватажка 
бойовиків Безлера – Данилюк [Russian special forces liquidated the militia’s leader Bezler - 
Danylyuk], RADIOSVOBODA (Nov. 7, 2014), 
https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/26679205.html [https://perma.cc/9ZWM-3ML6].  
99. Marchuk & Wanigasuriya, supra note 37 (referring to Press Release, Прокуратура АРК та міста Севастополя [The  Prosecutor’s Office of the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol], За заборону діяльності Меджлісу та переслідування учасників мітингу 26.02.2014 року біля будівлі Верховної Ради автономії Прокуратура АР Крим повідомила про підозру Н.В. Поклонській у вчиненні воєнного злочину [The Crimean Prosecutor’s Office served a notice of 
suspicion on the charges of war crimes to N. V. Poklonska for her role in the banning of 
the Mejlis and persecuting protesters near the building of the Crimean Supreme Council 
on February 26, 2014] (Oct. 10, 2018), 
https://ark.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=238396 
[https://perma.cc/8HTL-9VCP].   
100. ГПУ повідомила про підозру міністру оборони Росії і раднику Путіна [GPO 
served a notice of suspicion to the Russian Minister of Defence and Putin’s Advisor], HROMADSKE 
(Aug. 22, 2016), https://hromadske.ua/posts/hpu-povidomyla-pro-pidozru-ministru-
oborony-rosii-i-radnyku-putina [https://perma.cc/2PEE-F2PA].  
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of Ukraine and have not responded to the ICC requests for such 
information.101 
Although the Ukrainian national authorities put a lot of trust 
into the prospective ICC investigation (especially in relation to 
targeting senior Russian officials), the ICC cannot solve all of 
Ukraine’s problems with respect to the conflict-related crimes. A 
tremendous amount of responsibility weighs on the shoulders of 
the Ukrainian authorities, in particular the Ukrainian judiciary. 
The prospects of national prosecution and adjudication of the 
conflict-related crimes may also be strengthened by greater 
reliance of the Ukrainian national authorities on the procedural 
mechanism trials in absentia provided for in the Criminal 
Procedural Code.102 In the absence of effective control over the 
non-government controlled areas in eastern Ukraine as well as 
over Crimea, which hinders the apprehension of suspects, this 
procedural mechanism offers an attractive option. However, as 
noted by Ukrainian practitioners, it suffers from a number of 
flaws that may potentially interfere with fair trial safeguards under 
national and international law.103 Given the novelty of this 
mechanism, there is a certain degree of resistance among 
national judges to utilize it, especially in relation to the 
adjudication of the conflict-related crimes that normally entail 
high sentences. It will be a long and thorny road ahead for 
Ukraine in relation to the domestic prosecution of the conflict-
related crimes. The process can be facilitated by the legal reform 
of the domestic legislation, the ratification of the Rome Statute, 
and the national capacity building of the Ukrainian prosecutor’s 
office and judiciary. 
 
101. 2020 OTP Report, supra note 33, § 285.  
102. See Criminal Procedural Code of Ukraine, Відомості Верховної Ради 
[Verkhovna Rada Gazette], 2013, No. 9-10, No. 11-12, No. 13, p. 88, art. 297-1. 
103. See Press Release, Верховний Суд України [Supreme Court of Ukraine], Під час кримінального провадження за процедурою «in absentia» на одній чаші терезів 
– інтереси забезпечення ефективності провадження, а на другій – право особи на справедливий суд [During trials “in absentia” there are two issues on scales of justice—
the interests of serving effective justice and the right of a person to a fair trial] (May 22, 
2020), https://supreme.court.gov.ua/supreme/pres-centr/news/943591 
[https://perma.cc/5WSM-ADJ3]. 
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C. Mobilizing Civil Society 
1. Georgia 
In Georgia, amidst a lack of national prosecutions, civil 
society appears to have shouldered much of the burden of 
seeking justice on behalf of victims of the conflict. This could be 
attributed to several factors, including political unwillingness to 
deal with the conflict-related crimes, inaction of national 
authorities with respect to the investigation and prosecution of 
alleged crimes, and the reluctance of national authorities to share 
vital information with civil society groups.104 Regardless, civil 
society groups105 have worked with victims to document the 
alleged crimes, provided legal aid and rehabilitation services to 
victims, and advocated on their behalf.106 The obtained evidence 
and information was compiled into a report titled “August 
Ruins,” which was subsequently submitted to the ICC’s OTP in 
2009 pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute (Article 15 
communication).107 Additionally, following the Prosecutor’s 
request to the PTC for authorization of an investigation, 
Georgian civil society organizations108 visited numerous conflict-
affected villages and assisted victims of the alleged crimes to 
submit representations to the PTC regarding their views and 
expectations.109 Civil society organizations such as the Georgian 
 
104. Interview with Representative of Article 42 of the Constitution (now known as 
Rights Georgia), in Tbilisi, Geor. (Nov. 20, 2018) [hereinafter Article 42 Interview]; 
Interview with Nino Jomarjidze, Geor. Young Lawyers Ass’n (“GYLA”), in Tbilisi, Geor. 
(Nov. 21, 2018) [hereinafter Jomarjidze Interview]. 
105. See, e.g., Human Rights Center, Article 42 of the Constitution (now known as 
Rights Georgia), Justice International, Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, and the 
Georgian Center for Psychosocial and Medical Rehabilitation of Torture Victims. 
106. August Ruins Report, supra note 10, at viii; Meet our Members: Civil Society’s role 
in Georgia: Interview with Ms. Nino Tsagareshvili, COALITION FOR INT’L CRIM. CT. (Oct. 22, 
2019), http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20191022/civil-societys-role-georgia-
interview-with-nino [https://perma.cc/WU8B-XQCT] [hereinafter CICC Interrview]. 
107. Id. 
108. Georgian Coalition for International Criminal Court (GCICC), GEORGIAN YOUNG 
LAW. ASS'N (Feb. 19, 2019), http://nodiscrimination.gyla.ge/en/post/saqartvelos-
koalicia-siskhlis-samartlis-saertashoriso-sasamartlostvis [https://perma.cc/W5ZG-
4HC6].  
109. Situation in Georgia, No. ICC-01/15, Report on the Victims’ Representations 
Received Pursuant to Article 15(3) of the Rome Statute, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 3, 9 (Dec. 
4, 2015); Int’l P’ship for Hum. Rights et al., Representations Submitted on Behalf of Victims of 
International Crimes in the Sitution in Georgia Persuant to Article 15(3) of the Rome Statute to 
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Coalition for International Criminal Court (“GCICC”)110 have 
since engaged with various ICC organs sharing further 
information on challenges on the ground and areas for 
prioritization.111 The OTP is said to have been impressed with the 
quality of the reports submitted by Georgian civil society.112 
Interestingly however, the Prosecutor appears not to have relied 
on the information contained in these Article 15 communications 
in her request seeking the PTC’s authorization to initiate an 
investigation.113 Instead, the request relied on an evidentiary 
record comprised of media sources, public source documents, 
and previous non-judicial investigations. As some commentators 
suggest, this decision to rely on publicly available information, 
instead of the Article 15 communications, could be due to the 
OTP’s policy of maintaining the confidentiality of 
communications.114 On the other hand, international NGOs such 
as Human Rights Watch opine that the lack of transparency by 
the Georgian government regarding their domestic investigative 
steps placed Georgian civil society organizations in a weak 
position as they were unable to ascertain and provide information 
on domestic investigations to the OTP, thus weakening the 
leverage they had with the ICC.115 
Regardless, Georgian civil society has also assisted victims to 
explore other avenues through which to obtain justice, for 
instance by assisting victims to submit applications to the 
 
the International Criminal Court 3 (Nov. 12, 2015), 
https://www.srji.org/upload/medialibrary/b51/icc-georgia-submission-without-
annexes.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AGF-ENHU]. 
110. The GCICC is comprised of 7 NGOs: (i) Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association 
(“GYLA”); (ii) Human Rights Center; (iii) Rights Georgia (previously known as Article 
42 of the Constitution); (iv) Justice International; (v) The Georgian Centre for 
Psychosocial and Medical Rehabilitation of Torture Victims (“GCRT”); (vi) 
International Center on Conflict and Negotiation (“ICCN”); and (vii) Human Rights 
Priority. Georgian Coalition for International Criminal Court (GCICC), supra note 108. 
111. See CICC Interview, supra note 106. 
112. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRESSURE POINT: THE ICC’S IMPACT ON NATIONAL 
JUSTICE: LESSONS FROM COLOMBIA, GEORGIA, GUINEA, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 74 
(2018) [hereinafter HRW ICC National Impact Report]. 
113. Sarah Williams, Civil Society Participation in Preliminary Examinations, in 2 
QUALITY CONTROL IN PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS 553, 559 (Morten Bergsmo & Carsten 
Stahn eds., 2018). 
114. Id. at 560. 
115. HRW ICC National Impact Report, supra note 112, at 77. 
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European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”).116 However, 
despite a plethora of individual applications lodged to the 
ECtHR, no visible progress has materialized. Due to one of the 
three inter-state applications lodged by Georgia against Russia at 
the ECtHR relating to the armed conflict and its aftermath, 
Georgia v. Russia (II), App. No. 38263/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2021), 
hundreds of individual applications were put on the backburner 
awaiting the outcome of the inter-state claim.117 On January 21, 
2021, the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber delivered its judgment on the 
merits in the case. However, the impact of this judgment on 
individual applications is yet to be seen. Therefore, given this slow 
pace of progress, the ICC investigation is viewed as a beacon of 
hope for those seeking justice, as some civil society actors see the 
conflict as being “too big and serious to be confronted at the local 
or even regional level.”118 
However, the first year after the initiation of the ICC 
investigation was marred by limited engagement by the ICC with 
victims or civil society on the ground. Being the first situation 
investigated outside of the African continent, the sentiment was 
that the ICC was unfamiliar with the region in which it was 
operating. Similarly, having previously had limited reasons for 
interacting with the ICC, Georgians were unfamiliar with the ICC 
as a judicial institution. Confusion reigned regarding parallel 
proceedings at the ICJ and ECtHR, with many members of the 
public and even Georgian government officials being unable to 
 
116. In 2011, Georgia’s Human Rights Center (“HRC”), Georgian Young Lawyers’ 
Association, Article 42 (now known as Rights Georgia), and the Norwegian Helsinki 
Committee were representing victims in over 100 individual cases linked to the 2008 war 
at the ECtHR. NORWEGIAN HELSINKI COMM., UNABLE OR UNWILLING? GEORGIA’S FAULTY 
INVESTIGATION OF CRIMES COMMITTED DURING AND AFTER THE RUSSO-GEORGIAN WAR OF 
AUGUST 2008 6 (Aage Borchgrevink & Gunnar M. Ekeløve-Slydal eds., 2011). 
117. Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, New Inter-State Application 
Brought by Georgia Against Russia (Aug. 31, 2018); Geir Ulfstein & Isabella Risini, Inter-
State Applications under the European Convention on Human Rights: Strengths and Challenges, 
EJIL:TALK! (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/inter-state-applications-under-the-
european-convention-on-human-rights-strengths-and-challenges/ 
[https://perma.cc/6P5T-PB6R]. 
118. ICC opens investigation in Georgia, COALITION FOR INT’L CRIM. CT. (Jan. 28, 
2016), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/CICCMA_GeorgiaInv_Jan2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RM97-5FH9]; Nika Jeiranashvili, The Georgian Experience: A Story of 
How the ICC is Failing Victims in its First Case Outside Africa, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (May 10, 
2018), https://www.ijmonitor.org/2018/05/the-georgian-experience-a-story-of-how-
the-icc-is-failing-victims-in-its-first-case-outside-africa [https://perma.cc/WPF2-5UX4]. 
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differentiate between the various institutions, the ICC and ICJ in 
particular.119 Civil society actors link victims’ unawareness about 
the role and mandate of the ICC to the ICC’s lack of outreach 
activities.120 Against this background, civil society has played a key 
role in building bridges with the affected communities given the 
ICC’s limited engagement in this regard. For instance, civil 
society organizations have visited IDP settlements educating 
individuals regarding the ongoing ICC investigation and the 
mandate of the ICC, stepped in to stop the spread of 
misinformation regarding the ICC’s activities, educated the 
general public regarding the functioning of the ICC, etc.121 
The ICC’s engagement efforts witnessed an improvement in 
subsequent years, especially with the setting up of a team of 
investigators. Moreover, different organs of the ICC, including 
the OTP, Public Information and Outreach Section, the Victims 
Participation and Reparations Section, and the Trust Fund for 
Victims, have since stepped up their activities in Georgia by 
meeting with local civil society, arranging information sessions for 
affected communities, and conducting training sessions for local 
lawyers on victims’ participation.122 However, the confidential 
nature of the OTP’s investigative activities means that the public 
has gained limited insight regarding the OTP’s investigation 
efforts. According to the civil society representatives, the lack of 
knowledge of the OTP’s investigative activities has led to 
 
119. 10 Years after the August War: Victims of the Situation in Georgia, COALITION FOR 
INT’L CRIM. CT. (July 23, 2019), http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/situation-in-georgia 
[https://perma.cc/C2H8-DCAF]; Mariam Antadze et al., 10 Years After the War: Victims of 




120. Article 42 Interview, supra note 104; Jomarjidze Interview, supra note 104.  
121. Article 42 of Constitution et al., Civil Society Statement on International Justice Day, 
GEOR. CTR. FOR PSYCHOSOCIAL & MED. REHAB. TORTURE VICTIMS (2018), 
http://gcrt.ge/en/news/54 [https://perma.cc/SY5R-AG5Q]; Waiting on the ICC in 
Georgia, JUSTICE HUB (Apr. 23, 2018), https://justicehub.org/article/waiting-on-the-icc-
in-georgia [https://perma.cc/Y2H9-S2Y8].  
122. ICC Marks 17 July, Day of International Criminal Justice, INT'L CRIM. CT. (July 17, 
2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int//Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1471 
[https://perma.cc/43H9-BUPX]; Nika Jeiranashvili, How the ICC Can Still Be Meaningful 
in Georgia, JUSTICEINFO (May 28, 2019), https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/justiceinfo-
comment-and-debate/opinion/41542-how-the-icc-can-still-be-meaningful-in-
georgia.html [https://perma.cc/3FQC-YJMX]. 
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ambiguity, providing space for misinterpretation and false 
information about the ICC, thus damaging the ICC’s 
credibility.123 With the opening of the ICC’s first country office 
outside of the African continent in Tbilisi in December 2017,124 
civil society was optimistic that the Office would act as the solution 
for closing the information gap that had been created. 
Nevertheless, the insufficient staffing of the office, the language 
barrier which hindered direct communication with affected 
communities, and its presence in Tbilisi which limited the 
possibilities for interactions between affected individuals and ICC 
staff, gave rise to concerns from the outset.125 Hence, Georgian 
civil society has urged the ICC to raise awareness about its work 
by informing victims and the Georgian public of its activities 
(disclosing the non-confidential aspects that would not 
jeopardize the investigation).126 
2. Ukraine 
As in Georgia, civil society in Ukraine has also been 
instrumental in bringing conflict-related crimes into the 
spotlight. A significant number of communications under Article 
15 of the Rome Statute were submitted to the ICC in relation to 
the alleged crimes committed on the territory of Ukraine since 
the beginning of the Maidan protests until now.127 Many NGOs 
have cooperated in collecting evidence and preparing joint 
submissions to the ICC (e.g. the Ukrainian Helsinki Human 
Rights Group, the Regional Centre of Human Rights, Truth 
Hounds, the Kharkiv Human Rights Group). Unlike the 
complete breakdown of communication between civil society and 
national authorities in Georgia, there has been an unprecedented 
 
123. Jeiranashvili, supra note 118. 
124. Int’l Criminal Court Opens Field Office in Georgia, Led by Head of Office Dr. Kaupo 
Kand, GEORGIAN J. (Feb. 17, 2018), https://www.georgianjournal.ge/politics/34214-intl-
criminal-court-opens-field-office-in-georgia-led-by-head-of-office-dr-kaupo-kand.html 
[https://perma.cc/LSY4-SDBQ]. 
125. Article 42 Interview, supra note 104; Jomarjidze Interview, supra note 104.  
126. See Jared Ferrie, Georgians Want Answers from the ICC, JUSTICEINFO (May 2, 
2019), https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/tribunals/icc/41298-georgians-want-answers-
from-the-icc.html [https://perma.cc/7CVL-BUZX]. 
127. Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Report on Preliminary Examination 
Activities § 95-97 (Dec. 5, 2018) [hereinafter 2018 OTP Report]; Office of the Prosecutor 
of the ICC, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities § 286-287 (Dec 5., 2019); 2020 
OTP Report, supra note 33, § 285, 287. 
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level of cooperation between civil society and the Ukrainian 
national authorities, especially in connection with the 
preparation of joint communications to the ICC. As a general 
rule, the communications were thematic as they concerned 
specific alleged crimes either in Crimea or eastern Ukraine. For 
instance, one communication concerned the use of civilians as 
human shields during the takeover of the Ukrainian military 
facilities in Crimea in 2014.128 Another joint submission prepared 
by civil society in cooperation with CPO concerned the forcible 
conscription of Crimean residents to serve in the armed forces of 
the Russian Federation.129 The most recent submission concerns 
the extensive appropriation of property in Crimea which was 
unlawfully authorized by the courts of the Occupying Power.130 
The ICC communications regarding Crimea considerably differ 
from those submitted with respect to the conflict in eastern 
Ukraine. The latter detail the commission of more violent crimes, 
such as murder, torture and ill-treatment, sexual violence, and 
 
128. Press Release, Прокуратура АРК та міста Севастополя [The  Prosecutor’s 
Office of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol], До Міжнародного кримінального суду подані докази використання РФ цивільного населення як 
«живих щитів» під час окупації Криму [Submission concerning the use of civilians as 
human shields by the Russian Federation during the occupation of Crimea was 
communicated to the International Criminal Court] (Feb. 26, 2019), 
https://ark.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=246320 
[https://perma.cc/L9MQ-7ATM]. 
129.  Press Release, Прокуратура АРК та міста Севастополя [The  Prosecutor’s 
Office of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol], До Міжнародного кримінального суду передано звернення щодо незаконного примусу кримчан до служби у збройних силах РФ [Submission Concerning Forcible Conscription of 
Crimean Residents to Serve in Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was 
Communicated to the International Criminal Court] (jointly prepared with the Crimean 
Human Rights Group, the Regional Centre of Human Rights, and the Ukrainian 
Helsinki Human Rights Group) (Oct. 25, 2018), 
https://ark.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=239243 
[https://perma.cc/68AJ-QEWJ]. 
130. Press Release, Офіс Генерального прокурора України [General Prosecutor’s 
Office of Ukraine], Офіс Генерального прокурора направив восьме інформаційне повідомлення до МКС щодо порушень прав власності в окупованому Криму [GPO 
Submitted its Eighth Communication to the ICC Concerning Violations of Property 
Rights in the Occupied Crimea] (jointly prepared with the Regional Centre of Human 
Rights) (July 30, 2020), 
https://www.gp.gov.ua/ua/news?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=277804 
[https://perma.cc/ZP89-K2M6]. 
2021] VENTURING EAST 765 
indiscriminate attacks against civilians in eastern Ukraine,131 
while the former describe alleged crimes that are less violent in 
nature, albeit reflecting a broader persecutory policy of the 
Occupying Power targeting actual or perceived opponents of the 
Russian regime in Crimea. The submissions prepared jointly by 
civil society and the Ukrainian national authorities, paint a 
broader picture of persecutory practices in Crimea, in particular 
deliberate measures adopted by the Occupying Power to compel 
the disloyal segment of the population to leave the territory of the 
occupied Crimea, which has already led to the forced 
displacement of over 40,000 residents of Crimea.132 Further, the 
information relayed to the ICC describes various measures 
adopted by Russia for the transfer of parts of its own population 
into the occupied territory with the objective of altering the 
demographic compositions of Crimea (colonization).133 The 
crimes of colonization and forcible conscription were last 
adjudged by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 
with no judicial practice developed by contemporary 
international criminal courts and tribunals. Therefore, the 
communications on such “rare” international crimes may 
potentially advance the doctrine of international criminal law, 
prompting the ICC to deal with a broader range of crimes within 
its jurisdiction. 
 
131. Int’l P’ship for Human Rights & Truth Hounds, Attacks on Civilians and Civilian 
Infrastructure in Eastern Ukraine: March 2014 – November 2017, IPHR ONLINE 1, 40 (2017), 
https://iphronline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ICC-UA-15.02.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C2P9-67LQ]; Press Release, Kharkiv Human Rights Grp., Насильницькі злочини, скоєні в ході збройного конфлікту на сході України у 2014–
2018  [Violent Crimes Committed During the Armed Conflict in Eastern Ukraine in 
2014-2018] (Mar. 12, 2019), http://khpg.org/index.php?id=1552383658 
[https://perma.cc/JUH5-V89B]. 
132.  Press Release, Прокуратура АРК та міста Севастополя [The  Prosecutor’s 
Office of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol], До Міжнародного кримінального суду передали нові свідчення про злочини Росії в Криму [New 
Evidence Regarding Russian Crimes Was Communicated to the ICC] (Jan. 31, 2020), 
https://ark.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=266001 
[https://perma.cc/YD22-HBPU] (concerning forcible transfer of IDPs and the change 
of the demographic composition of the population in Crimea). 
133. Id.; S. Zayets, R. Martynovskyy, & D. Svyrydova, Crimea beyond rules: Forcible 
Expulsion of the Civilian Population from the Occupied Territory by Russia, Крымский прецедент (2018), https://krymbezpravil.org.ua/en/issues/crimea-beyond-the-rules-
special-issue-forcible-expulsion-of-the-civilian-population-from-the-occupied-territory-by-
russia/ [https://perma.cc/ZP89-K2M6]. 
766 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:3 
The avalanche of information regarding the alleged crimes 
prompted the OTP to state in its 2018 annual report that it was 
overwhelmed by the volume of information in its possession in 
relation to the conflict in Ukraine, and that it sought to “prioritize 
certain forms of alleged conduct believed to be most 
representative of the patterns of alleged crimes.”134 The report 
also took note of the OTP’s extensive engagement with the 
Ukrainian national authorities and civil society.135 Civil society has 
played a tremendous role in raising awareness about the ICC, 
collecting evidence and building bridges with the Ukrainian 
national authorities. This unprecedented level of engagement 
with the Ukrainian national authorities resulted in the higher 
quality of communications submitted to the ICC, as the evidence 
was cross-checked and some of it formed part of ongoing national 
criminal proceedings. 
IV GEORGIA AND UKRAINE: SIMILAR CHALLENGES BUT 
DIFFERENT RESPONSES 
Both Georgia and Ukraine as post-Soviet countries share a 
similar legal culture and have similar techniques for investigating 
and prosecuting crimes. The situations of Ukraine and Georgia 
at the ICC have arisen out of a military standoff with Russia. The 
armed conflicts in both counties have produced similar 
consequences (i.e. absence of control over parts of their territory; 
denial of access to non-government controlled areas and 
accompanying challenges linked to the collection of evidence; 
and non-cooperation of Russian authorities with respect to the 
surrender and extradition of suspects and exchange of 
information). Despite sharing many common challenges, the 
approaches of both countries for tackling international crimes 
diverge significantly. 
Georgia has taken a rather passive stance towards the 
domestic prosecution of the conflict-related crimes. Unlike 
Georgia, Ukraine appears to be more eager to investigate and 
prosecute. However, it has faced a number of obstacles in 
achieving its ambitious goals, such as unfamiliarity with dealing 
with international crimes, and unwillingness to scrutinize the 
 
134. 2018 OTP REPORT, supra note 127, § 95. 
135. Id. § 97. 
2021] VENTURING EAST 767 
actions of the Ukrainian armed forces and law enforcement 
agencies; evidentiary challenges due to the lack of effective 
control over Crimea and non-government controlled areas in 
eastern Ukraine; and the incorrect legal qualification of crimes in 
eastern Ukraine as terrorist offences.136 
It is also interesting that Georgia as a State Party to the Rome 
Statute was better positioned to deal with the conflict-related 
crimes, as it had made all the necessary changes to its national 
legislation upon ratifying the Rome Statute. However, it missed 
its opportunity to fully utilize the available legal tools and refused 
to disclose any information on the progress of national 
proceedings to the general public, and has left the task of 
advocating on behalf of victims to civil society. In contrast, 
Ukraine, as a non-ratifying state, has witnessed a flurry of 
legislative initiatives to reform Ukrainian legislation to align it 
with international law, and has subjected itself to the jurisdiction 
of the ICC by accepting the ad hoc jurisdiction of the ICC on two 
separate occasions.137 Ukrainian national authorities closely 
cooperate with civil society in preparing joint submissions to the 
ICC and are fully transparent about the information they have 
communicated to the ICC.138 
Both Georgia and Ukraine are at loggerheads with Russia—
a powerful adversary. Unsurprisingly, news of the initiation of an 
investigation into the situation in Georgia received a cold 
reception from the Russian Federation. Russia accused the ICC 
Prosecutor of siding with the aggressor and initiating an 
investigation aimed at victims.139 Additionally, in a largely 
symbolic move, in November 2016, the president of the Russian 
Federation issued bylaw No 361-rp, which had the effect of 
withdrawing Russia’s signature to the Rome Statute, which it had 
never ratified.140 Russia’s withdrawal of its signature was prompted 
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by the issuance of the OTP annual report (2016), which found 
that Russia effectively occupied Crimea and was involved in 
steering the conflict in eastern Ukraine.141 Among the reasons for 
the withdrawal, the Russian MFA official statement named the 
ICC’s failure to live up to the expectations of becoming “a truly 
independent, authoritative international tribunal,” its poor 
performance record in comparison to the costs, and the distrust 
of the African states towards the ICC.142 While the statement did 
not make a single reference to the situation in Ukraine, it alleged 
the ICC’s biased handling of Georgia’s situation.143 It further 
stated that the ICC was heaping the blame on South Ossetian and 
Russian soldiers, while leaving out “actions and orders of 
Georgian officials . . . to the discretion of the Georgian justice.”144 
Russia’s symbolic withdrawal of its signature from the Rome 
Statute can be viewed as a “tactical move signaling that the ICC 
should not count on any cooperation from Russia during the 
course of its examination of alleged crimes in Crimea and eastern 
Ukraine.”145 Russia has already ceased its cooperation with the 
ICC with respect to the investigation of Georgia’s situation, 
notwithstanding that earlier it chose to cooperate with the ICC.146 
Georgian and Ukrainian national authorities have been 
placing all blame on the Russian armed forces and its proxy forces 
in South Ossetia and eastern Ukraine. Therefore, ICC attempts 
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to prosecute Georgian and/or Ukrainian armed forces will most 
likely be met with open hostility in both countries. Such fears of 
their “own” armed forces being tried in The Hague are amply 
exploited by politicians in both countries. Little has been done to 
dispel these myths about the ICC in Georgia and Ukraine. The 
ICC Prosecutor prioritizes the prosecution of individuals bearing 
the most serious responsibility for the crimes falling within the 
ICC’s jurisdiction. It is doubtful whether members of the 
Ukrainian and/or Georgian armed forces will make the cut. This, 
however, does not mean that the conflict-related crimes alleged 
to have been committed by the Georgian and Ukrainian armed 
forces should go unpunished. It is a chance for both Georgian 
and Ukrainian national authorities to demonstrate how 
complementarity works in practice, and to prove that effective 
prosecution and adjudication of such crimes is possible at the 
national level. Although the ICC has positively impacted domestic 
processes in Georgia and Ukraine to a certain extent, it cannot be 
seen as a panacea for all the conflict-related problems. Both states 
have to assume responsibility for achieving justice at home. 
Georgia is reluctant to assume such responsibility. However, 
Ukraine appears to have chosen the path of national justice for 
international crimes in parallel to pursuing international justice 
at the ICC, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Only 
time will tell if Ukraine’s thirst for justice will translate into real 
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